The explosion of protectionist measures, high inflation, huge debt burdens and economic slowdowns continue to have detrimental effects across the world. In the midst of these, the global economy has been experiencing significant geopolitical changes. Although the World Trade Organization (WTO) Members have managed to deliver on two important multilateral agreements since its creation, namely the Trade Facilitation and the Fisheries Subsidies Agreements, negotiations under the Doha Development Round have stalled. In addition to the stalemate, there is a rise of protectionism alongside the purported invocation of national security exceptions to justify them. Trade wars are erupting between the countries that designed the post-second World War global order, coupled with what looks like an irremediable crisis in the WTO dispute settlement system. These events are constant reminders of the gravity of the threat to multilateralism. That the WTO is facing its worst existential crisis is, therefore, not an exaggeration.

As the world continues its struggle to recover from the coronavirus pandemic (Covid-19), the war between Russia and Ukraine added another dimension to an already tense situation. Changes to the global order due to the war in Ukraine have also put Africa in the geopolitical spotlight as a new arena for the struggle between the United States, European countries, and Asian states. As African countries persistently refuse to pick a side in these ongoing military and economic conflicts, the world may be entering a new geoeconomics order.

The creation of the WTO once reaffirmed the choice in favour of multilateral trade liberalization. However, regional/preferential trade agreements have proliferated in the face of the WTO’s actual and perceived difficulties in adapting to a changing global trade environment. Responding to and revealing this changing global trade environment, African countries concluded the Agreement establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in 2018. The AfCFTA Agreement entered into force in 2019 and the implementation phase started with an official start of trading on 1 January 2021. Trade is, therefore, bound to take place under its auspices between State Parties to the Agreement that have deposited their instruments of ratification.

More complex yet, despite the official start of the trading date, some challenges remain to be addressed before the AfCFTA can realize its full potential. These include, for example, completing negotiations on rules of origin, tariff concessions for trade in goods and schedules of specific commitments in services. In the meantime, AfCFTA State Parties have signed trade and investment agreements with third states, and other negotiations are under consideration. The impacts of these “side deals” on the implementation of the AfCFTA are yet to be seen. However, their consistency in consolidating intra-African trade and investment has generated a vigorous debate splitting African countries into different camps. In the meantime, a broad range of efforts to reform the international investment regime has raised similar questions – will these reforms rectify or retrench Africa’s marginal position in the global economy?